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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-3102(3)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIE,v
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding Respondent 2010-1 RADC
CADC Venture' s claims against Petitioner could be deemed to relate back to the filing of
a complaint by another party under the provisions of Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Standard of Appellate Review: De novo. This Court considers appeals from a
district court's summary judgment decision "under a de nova standard of review, granting
no deference to the district court's analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake

Ct:y., 2011 UT 63, ,r 8,266 P.3d 797. This de nova standard has also been called
"correctness" by this Court and applies "regardless of the nature of the underlying law
governing the parties' rights." Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, 'il-J 15-16, 250 P.3d 56. See also

Ga,y Porter Const. v. Fox Const., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, tJ 31, 101 P.3d 371 (holding
that "a correctness standard applies to a trial court's rule 15(c) analysis").
Presented in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 7-10.
2. ·whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of
100% of the amount due on the note to Respondent 2010-1 RADC CADC Venture after
determining Petitioner's argument was inadequately briefed.
Standard of Appellate Review: De novo. This Court considers appeals from a
district court's summary judgment decision "under a de novo standard of review, granting

1

no deference to the district court's analysis." L. C. Canyon Partners, L.L. C. v. Salt Lake

Cty., 2011 UT 63, ~ 8,266 P.3d 797. This de novo standard has also been called
"correctness" by this Court and applies "regardless of the nature of the underlying law
governing the parties' rights." Bahrv. I1nus, 2011 UT 19~ ~,I 15-16, 250 P.3d 56.
Presented in Petition for ,vrit of Certiorari at pages 10-13.
DETERl\flNITIVE PROVISION
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee -- Action to
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security -Collection of costs and attorney's fees.

At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided
in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in
that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that ,·vas
secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market
value of the property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find
the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the
fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable
attorney fees incurred.
STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE

This case was originally brought as a deficiency action by a plaintiff with a 52%
interest in the loan. Though the other plaintiff did not bring a deficiency action within the
three-month statute of limitations and owned only a 48% interest in the loan, the district
court granted that party summary judgment and awarded it a judgment for 100% of the
total amount due under the note. The court of appeals affirmed. The petitioners seek
review by this Court.

2

Procedural History
On January 14, 2011, subsequent to a foreclosure sale that occurred on December
3, 2010, Utah First Federal Credit Union ("Utah First") commenced an action for
deficiency against Dos Lagos, LLC; Mellon Valley, LLC; Roland Neil Family Limited
Partnership; Roland N. Walker; and Sally Vvalker (collectively "Dos Lagos"). (R. 1-28.)
Utah First alleged that the total amount due on the loan was $1,819,774.97. Ten months
later, on November 15, 2011, Utah First filed an Amended Complaint, adding 2010-1
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC ("RADC") as a plaintiff, asserting that Utah First had an
undivided 52% interest in the loan and RADC had a 48% undivided interest in the loan,
and leaving the total amount due on the loan as $1,819,774.97. (R. 303-334.) Ten months
after that, on September 7, 2012, Utah First and RADC filed a Second Amended
Complaint, modifying the total amount due under the promissory note at the time of the
foreclosure sale from $1,819,774.97 to $3,426,701.91. (R. 635-642.)
In 2012, Utah First and RADC filed motions for summary judgment. Dos Lagos
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court denied Utah First' s
motion 1, denied Dos Lagos's motion, and granted RADC's motion for summary
judgment in its Ruling on Dispositive Motions dated April 25, 2013. 2 (R. 826-838.) The
district court subsequently entered two additional orders. The first, dated July 25, 2013,

1

The court denied Utah First's motion for summary judgment due to unresolved
questions of fact relating to whether its participation in the loan was legal and whether
any of the Dos Lagos parties were members of the credit union. Utah First subsequently
sought and received leave to voluntarily dismiss its claims without prejudice, rendering
RADC'sjudgments final. (R. 1097-1101.)
2
This ruling is attached hereto as Addendum B.
3

awarded RADC a judgment against Dos Lagos and Mellon Valley in the total amount due
under the loan, minus the fair market value of the property foreclosed on by Utah First. 3
(R. 936-939.) The second, dated August 16, 2013, awarded RADC a judgment against the

guarantors of the loan, the Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland N. \\Talker,
and Sally Vlalker. 4 (R. 991-993.)
In an opinion dated April 28, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's rulings, orders, and judgments. 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos,
LLC, 2016 UT App 89,372 P.3d 683. 5

Statement of Facts
The facts in this case are generally not in dispute. The follmving facts are
condensed principally from the district court's Ruling on Dispositive A-fotions (R. 826838), with additional record citations as appropriate:
1.

Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered into a Business Loan

Agreement with America \Vest Bank in March 2007. (R. 768-775.)
2.

On December 6, 2007, America \Vest Bank entered into a loan

Participation Agreement with Utah First wherein America \Vest Bank retained an
undivided 48% interest in the loan and Utah First obtained an undivided 52% interest in
the loan. (R. 555-559, 786-790.)
3.

On December 5, 2008, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC executed

a Change in Terms Agreement, which restated, modified and extended their Promissory
3

This judgment is attached hereto as Addendum C.
This judgment is attached hereto as Addendum D.
5
This opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A.

4

4

Note with America West Bank dated March 29, 2007, with a principal amount of
$2,500,000.00. (R. 561-563.)
4.

The Promissory Note was secured by real property owned by Mellon

Valley, LLC located in Hurricane, \Vashington County, Utah. (R. 565-572.)
5.

On May 1, 2009, the FDIC closed America \Vest Bank and seized its

interest in the Promissory Note. (R. 546-554.)
6.

In 2010, the FDIC auctioned, sold, assigned, and transferred America West

Bank's interest in the Promissory Note to 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. (R. 792795.)
7.

On December 6, 2010, the property securing the Promissory Note was sold

at trustee's sale for $1,060,000.00 to the highest bidder, 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture,
LLC. (R. 546-554, 590-591.)
8.

The value of the property securing the Promissory Note was $1,510,000.00

at the time of the December 6, 2010 trustee's sale. (R. 620-625.)
9.

On December 6, 2010, the outstanding payoff balance on the loan was

$3,426,701.91. (R. 546-554.)
I 0.

The Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland N. \Valker, and Sally

Walker personally guaranteed the loan. (R. 776-784.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court of appeals failed to correctly apply Utah law to its analysis of the statute
of limitations issues in this case and improperly affirmed the judgment of 100% of the
amount due under the loan to RADC, which owns only a 48% interest in the loan.
5

RADC did not file an action within the three-month statute of limitations, and its
claim against Dos Lagos is accordingly ba1Ted. The court of appeals erred in holding that
the Rule 15(c) relation back doctrine extended to allow the addition of RADC's tardy
claim. The relation back doctrine found in the actual language of Rule 15(c) does not
apply to the addition of parties. But the court of appeals held that the exception, which
allows relation back for new parties with an identity of interest to the old parties, applied
to RADC's new claim on two grounds: notice and identity of interest.
The court of appeals incoITectly found that notice of Utah First's claim was
sufficient to give Dos Lagos notice of RADC's claim. Utah First brought suit for
deficiency against Dos Lagos and claimed only its 52% share of the amount due under
the note. Nothing about that claim gave notice to Dos Lagos that RADC intended to bring
an action to collect on its independent 48% interest.
The court of appeals also incorrectly found that Utah First and RADC had an
identity of interest sufficient to trigger the exception. Utah law clearly holds that privity
of contract is not sufficient to establish an identity of interest. In this case, Utah First and
RADC's only link is their contractual loan pru.iicipation agreement. The two entities
obtained their interests in the loan separately, have separate business operations, and had
legally different results before the trial comi. Further, Utah precedent and policy dictate
that procedural rules cannot override clear statutory requirements like the three-month
deadline found in the deficiency statute.
RADC, under both statute and contract, is entitled to collect only its 48% interest
in the loan. The court of appeals incorrectly held that Dos Lagos failed to adequately

6

brief this issue. Dos Lagos addressed the issue substantially in both its opening and reply
briefs to the court. Though it has not found case law directly on point, Dos Lagos pointed
the court of appeals to both statutory and contract law in support of its argument that
RADC should not have been awarded a judgment for the full amount due under the loan.
The judgment awarded to RADC is precisely the kind of windfall the deficiency
statute is designed to prevent. RADC's judgment is subject to the yet-to-be-determined
rights and interests of Utah First, but those rights and interests may not be legally
recognizable, leaving RADC with a windfall. Further, RADC obtained the property
securing the loan with a credit bid. Subtracting the value of that property from its
proportional share of the loan leaves it with a fraction of the judgment actually due to it.
The contracts at issue also preclude RADC from a judgment in the full amount
due. Under the Business Loan Agreement, Dos Lagos agreed that participants in the loan
would be an "absolute owner[]" of its interest and could independently "enforce its
interests." In addition, the participation agreement limits RADC to $1,200,000.
The opinion of the court of appeals contains two reversible errors, and its decision
is entitled to no deference. This Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals and
hold that (1) RADC's claim is not entitled to relation back under Rule 15(c) and is thus
time barred by the statute oflimitations and (2) RADC's claim, if any remains, is limited
to its 48% interest.

ARGUl\ffiNT
The court of appeals failed to correctly apply Utah law to its analysis of the statute
of limitations issues in this case and improperly affirmed a judgn1ent for 100% of the

7

total amount due under a loan to a party that

O\\'llS

only a 48% interest in that loan.

Specifically, the court of appeals erred in (1) concluding that RADC's claims were
deemed to relate back to the filing of Utah Firsfs complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 6 and (2) holding that Dos Lagos's briefing was inadequate and
thus affimnng the distiict cou1i' s award of 100% of the amount due on the loan to
RA.DC, which has only a 48% interest in the loan.

I.

THE COu'RT OF APPEALS ERRED ,,THEN IT AFFIR\iED THAT
RADC'S CL.All\! FOR DEFICIENCY \\'AS NOT B.ARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF Lil\flTATIONS.
The court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the district court's ruling that RADC's

claim against Dos Lagos was not barred by the statute of limitations, despite the
undisputed fact that RADC did not file a complaint within the three months required by
statute. The court of appeals erred, specifically, when it held that the purposes of Rule
15(c) were met and that RADC and Utah First have an identity of interest sufficient to
trigger the exception to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allowing relation
back to parties with an identity of interest.
RA.DC did not file a deficiency action against Dos Lagos within the required three
months. The statute of limitations for an action for deficiency after the foreclosure of
property securing a note is within three months after the sale of the prope1iy. Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-32. This statute is a creditor's only avenue to recover any deficiency. See,
6

If this Court ultimately finds that RADC's complaint did not relate back to the original

complaint filed by Utah First or that RADC was not entitled to a judgment for the full
amount due under the note, the judgment against the guarantors, Roland Neil Family
Limited Partnership, Roland N. \Valker, and Sally Walker, should be dismissed or
modified accordingly.

8

e.g., Machock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30,122, 137 P.3d 779. In this case, the property was

sold on December 3, 2010, making the deadline to file a deficiency action March 3, 2011.
While Utah First filed a complaint related to its 52% interest in the loan within the
deadline in January 2011, RA.DC did not file an independent action or appear on any
complaint against Dos Lagos until November 15, 2011, over eight months past the
deadline, and did not add in its 48% share of the loan deficiency until September 2012.
RADC's deficiency action is not saved by the relation back doctrine found in Rule
15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) allows an amended complaint to
"relate back" to the date of the original complaint "[w ]henever the claim, or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)
(emphasis added). But, by its own terms, Rule 15(c) applies only to "claims" and
"defenses" not to parties. Indeed, Utah courts have confirmed that "[g]enerally Rule 15(c)
... will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new parties for those
brought before the court by the original pleadings-whether plaintiff or defendant."
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902,906 (Utah 1976).

Nor does the exception to Rule 15(c) apply to save RADC's deficiency action.
"The exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant,
when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the
relation back is not prejudicial." Id. The relation back doctrine "invokes a constructive
timing fiction with respect to certain amended pleadings" and "has been interpreted to
extend not just to the parties to the original pleading but also to those who share an
9

'identity of interest' with them." VCS, Inc. v. Utah Comniunity Bank, 2012 UT 89, ,r 25,
293 P.3d 290. In this case, Utah First's lawsuit did not constitute notice to Dos Lagos that
RADC would seek a deficiency judgment, nor do Utah First and RA.CD have an identity
of interest sufficient to trigger the exception to Rule 15 (c).
First, the comi of appeals enoneously held that the exception requires simply that
a paiiy have notice oflitigation concerning a particular occurrence. 2010-1 R4DC/CADC

Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, if 12, 372 P.3d 683 (citing Bald1-vi11
County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984)). The com1 of appeals
noted that the amended complaint "did not assert new claims" and "did nothing more
than add RADC, a successor coholder of the very note Utah First had sued upon, as a
plaintiff." Id. Based on this, the court held that upon receipt of the first complaint, Dos
Lagos "received sufficient notice to satisfy the rational of rule 15(c). " 7 Id.
Dos Lagos, for obvious reasons, asserts that being on notice that one creditor
intends to sue is substantially different from being on notice that an additional creditor
intends to sue. As this Cami has recognized, one of the purposes of the three-month time
period is to allow the debtor to "plan accordingly." Standard Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass 'n v.

Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1991). Creditors receive a quick remedy of
foreclosure but then have to quickly give notice to the debtor of an intention to seek a
deficiency, which prevents the debtor from being left in financial limbo. Id. Dos Lagos's
7

In support of this holding, the court cited only two federal cases considering "the

comparable federal rule." The Utah exception, in apparent contrast with the federal rule,
does not extend to amendments that add new parties "who have no identity of interest
with existing parties." Russell v. Standard Co1p., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995)
( citations omitted).
10

loan agreements were all with America West Banlc, succeeded in interest by RADC. And
yet, RADC did not file a deficiency action. Dos Lagos did receive notice that Utah First,
asserting only its 52% interest in loan via the participation agreement, sought a deficiency
judgment, and Dos Lagos planned accordingly. But Dos Lagos was certainly not on
notice that RADC sought a deficiency judgment. And the addition of RADC to the action
also meant that, in addition to Utah First's claim for its 52% of the loan proceeds,
RADC's claim for its 48% of the loan proceeds was added. Thus, the court of appeals got
it V\rrong on both counts, i.e., a claim was in fact added and notice of Utah First's claim
was not notice to Dos Lagos of RADC' s claim. The insufficiency of the notice of an
action from RADC is particularly apparent where, as here, the two creditors do not have
the identity of interest contemplated by the exception.
Second, the court of appeals erroneously held that RADC and Utah First had an
identity of interest. An identity of interest in this context is defined as follows:
[t]he parties are so closely related in their business operations that notice of the
action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the other. Such an
identity exists, for example, between past and present forms of the same
enterprise.

Peny v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214,217 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted). However, "privity of contract alone is an insufficient identity of interest for
relation back under rule 15(c)." Russell v. Standard Co,p., 898 P.2d 263,265 (Utah
1995).
Despite clear Utah law on the subject, the court of appeals held that "[t]here is
perhaps no closer identity of interest than that shared by two parties who are joint holders

11

of the same note." 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLCv. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App
89, ,I 13, 372 P.3d 683. In so holding, the court of appeals ignored the progeny of cases
decided by this Court on this very issue, all of which hold that mere privity of contract the only thing binding Utah First and RA.DC in this case - is not a sufficient identity of
interest to trigger the exception. See, e.g., PenJJ v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681
P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995);
VCS, Inc. v. Utah Community Bank, 2012 UT 89, ,I 27,293 P.3d 290.

In Peny, a general contractor sued a subcontractor, Perry, for breach of contract
related to some defective doors. Peny v. Pioneer Tf7iolesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214
(Utah 1984). Almost three years later, after the statute oflimitations had expired, Perry
attempted to have its third-party complaint against the door supplier relate back to the
filing of the original action. Id. at 217. This Court rejected that approach and held that
where there ·was "no evidence showing any identity of interest between the [parties] other
than privity of contract," the identity of interest was insufficient for the purpose of Rule
15(c). Id.
Likewise, in Russell, the plaintiff sued The Associated Press and The Salt Lake
Tribune for alleged defamatory remarks contained in an article originally published by
the Ogden Standard Examiner. Russell v. Standard Co,p., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). The
plaintiff later sought to use Rule 15(c) to have her tardy claim against Standard relate
back to the date of her original complaint. Id. at 265. Though the ne\\'S organizations all
published the article and had contracts among themselves, this Comi declined to allow
the relation back, holding that "privity of contract alone is an insufficient identity of
12

interest for relation back under rule 15(c)." Id.
In VCS, Inc. v. Utah Conununity Bank, this Court more recently considered the
question of the exception to the relation back doctrine permitting the relation back of an
amended complaint adding a party where the party has an identity of interest. 2012 UT
89, 293 P.3d 290. VCS, a contractor, filed suit against the developer for lack of payment.
VCS later argued that its tardy complaint against the financing bank should relate back to
its original complaint against the developer. Again, this Court rejected the argument and
held that VSC "fails to establish ... that [the two defendants] share an 'identity of
interest' and thus the relation back doctrine cannot excuse its failure to join [the second
defendant] within the timeframe required by statute." Id. The court fmiher emphasized
that "[o]ur precedent accordingly forecloses VCS's assertion that [the two defendants]
shared an identity of interest based on their contractual relationship. Id.
Like the parties in Peny, Russell, and VCS, the only tie between RADC and Utah
First, in this case, is their contractual relationship as defined in the participation
agreement, i.e., their privity of contract. Under Utah law, that privity of contract is not an
identity of interest sufficient to trigger the relation back doctrine in Rule 15(c). Nor do
RADC and Utah First have any other markers of an identity of interest. They are not so
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to
provide notice of the action to the other. In fact, Utah First and RADC are separate and
distinct entities with separate and distinct interests and have no related business
operations. They obtained their interests in the note at issue in two different ways, as
shown in the chart below.
13
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This lack of an identity of interest becomes even clearer when considering the
posture of each entity on summary judgment. The district court denied Utah First's
motion for summary judgment, while granting RADC' s motion for summary judgment.
(R. 826-838.) If these two entities had an identity of interests, they would have been in

the same or similar position on the motions for summary judgment. And yet, they were
not. The facts related to the positions of Utah First and RADC even in relation to the
same note were different and concluded with different legal results. The dist1ict court
appropriately treated the two entities and their claims as separate, and the comt of appeals
should have determined that they did not have an identity of interest sufficient to trigger
the exception to the relation back doctrine in Rule IS(c). Its failure to do so resulted in
prejudice to Dos Lagos.
14

Finally, Utah law and public policy dictate that procedural rules should not
override clear statutory requirements. In Donjuan v. McDermott, this Court considered
the application of the Rule 15 relation back doctrine in the context of the strict statutory
scheme for adoptions. 2011 UT 72, 266 P.3d 839. This Court held that Rule 15 did not
operate to save the father's claim because he failed to comply with the statut01y
requirements: "[o]ur general rules of procedure cannot obviate such explicit statutory
requirements." Id. at ,116. Similarly, the relation back doctrine in Rule 15 cannot operate
here to relieve RADC of its strict and explicit statutory requirement to file a deficiency
action within the three month statute of limitation, particularly where RADC and Utah
First lack an identity of interest. 8
This Court should reverse the court of appeals and hold that RADC and Utah First
lacked an identity of interest sufficient to trigger the exception to Rule 15(c) and that

RADC's complaint was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED \VIIEN IT AFFIRMED THAT RADC
ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF 100% OF THE Al\1:OUNT DUE.

\ \7AS

Even if this Court determines that RADC's claims were timely, the court of
appeals erroneously held that RADC was entitled to a judgment that included 100% of
the amount due on the loan, despite RADC's 48% interest in the loan and acquisition of
the property securing the loan. Rather than determine this question on its merits, the court

8

The court of appeals also noted that "as a policy matter, cases such as this one should be
decided in a single action." 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, 2016 UT App 89 at ,I 14
(citations omitted). Dos Lagos does not dispute that policy but does dispute that such a
policy can or should relieve one or more of the parties from the applicable statute of
limitations requirements.
15

of appeals decided not to reach the issue:
Appellants complain that the district court's order, making the judgment subject to
any subsequently determined interest of Utah First, "cited no lm;v." But after
registering this complaint, Appellants direct this court to no statute, case, or other
authority that supports their contention that the district court got this \vTong.
Appellants' failure to carry their burden of persuasion on appeal is a sufficient
ground for us to reject this argument. See Hi-CountJJ; Estates Hom.eovi;ners Ass 'n
v. Jesse Rodney Dansie Living Trust, 2015 UT App 281, fl 8,359 P.3d 655.

2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, 'i121, 372 P.3d

683.
This Court has declared that ''[f]ailure to provide any analysis or legal authority
constitutes inadequate briefing." Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ~ 7, 17
P.3d 1122 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Dos Lagos's briefing on this issue was not inadequate. In its opening brief to the
court of appeals, Dos Lagos dedicated over two full pages to this argument and provided
both analysis and legal authority to support its argument. 9 Though, admittedly, Dos
Lagos could not (and still has not) found legal authority directly on point, it argued in its
opening brief that allowing RADC to collect 100% of a note, of which it owns only 48%,
is precisely the kind of windfall the deficiency statute is trying to prevent.

10

RADC purchased America West Bank's interest in 48% of the loan at issue. After
granting sunm1ary judgment to RADC and denying summary judgment to Utah First, the
district court awarded RADC a judgment for 100% of the amount due under the note,
9

The relevant excerpt of Petitioner's opening brief to the court of appeals is attached
hereto as Addendum E.
10
RADC's brief to the court of appeals addressed this issue in just under n;vo pages and
only cited the Loan Agreement between America Vvest Bank and Dos Lagos, the
Commercial Guaranties, and the distiict court's ruling.
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"subject to any subsequently determined interest of Utah First Federal Credit Union." (R.
836 n.7.) The problem with this approach is that such a judgment gives RADC immediate
leave to collect on that judgment, which it has done. And yet, if, at some point in the
future, Utah First is determined to not have any legally cognizable interest in the loan~
RADC will be left with a windfall.
Further, RADC acquired the foreclosed property, which was worth $1,510,000.00.
With a total amount due under the note of $3,426,701.91, RADC's 48% share of that is
$1,644,816.92. Subtracting the value of the foreclosed property from RADC's share,
RADC is left with just $134,816.92 owed to it. And yet, the district court awarded it a
judgment of almost $3 million. Allowing RADC to retain a judgment for the full amount
is not only unjust, inequitable, and subject to the legal issues discussed herein but is also
a slippery slope and dangerous precedent to set for other participating creditors.
The court of appeals noted that "it would be unjust to allow debtors to avoid
responsibility for a substantial portion of their obligations simply because one of two
creditors on a single debt takes the laboring oar in collecting the debt." 2010-1

RADC/CADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, 9if 22, 3 72 P .3d 683.
'~

That statement is inapplicable here. RADC did not take "the laboring oar" in collecting
the debt, and Utah First and RADC are not "joint owners." They have distinct interests in
the note, and Utah First brought the only timely action under the note. RADC was then
improperly allowed to join the action. RADC was successful in its claims, and Utah First
was not. It is not equitable then, to bestow a windfall on RADC when it received the
foreclosed property and its claims extend only to 48% of the amount due on the loan.
17

In its reply brief to the court of appeals, Dos Lagos dedicated over three pages to
this very issue, this time focusing its argument on Utah contract law and the contracts
among the parties: the Loan Agreement, the Commercial Guaranties, and the
Participation Agreement.

11

RADC is entitled only to its 48% interest in the loan. In the Business Loan
Agreement, executed by America \Vest Bank and Dos Lagos, Dos Lagos agreed to the
following provision on loan participation:
Consent to Loan Participation. Borrower agrees and consents to Lender's sale or
transfer, whether now or later, of one or more participation interests in the Loan to
one or more purchasers, whether related or unrelated to Lender. Lender may
provide, without any limitation whatsoever, to any one or more purchasers, or
potential purchases, any information or knowledge Lender may have about
Borrower or about any other matter relating to the Loan, and Borrower hereby
waives any rights to privacy Borrower may have with respect to such matters.
Borrower also agrees that the purchasers of anv such participation interests will be
considered as the absolute owners of such interest in the Loan and will have all the
rights granted under the participation agreement or agreements governing the sale
of such participation interests. Borrower further waives all rights of offset or
counterclaim that it may have now or later against Lender or against any purchaser
of such a participation interest and unconditionally agrees that either Lender or
such purchaser may enforce Borrower's obligation under the Loan in-espective of
the failure or insolvency of any holder of any interest in the Loan. Borrower
further aQI'ees that the purchaser of any such participation interests mav enforce its
interests irrespective of any personal claims or defenses that Borrmver may have
at?:ainst Lender.

(R. 771 (emphasis added).) Everything in this provision indicates that a participation
agreement cleaves the interests of the paiticipants. A participant is the "absolute owner[]"
of its interest and may independently "enforce its interests." And, of course, as the drafter
of this agreement, any ambiguities are construed against America \Vest Bank and its
11

The relevant excerpt of Petitioner's opening brief to the court of appeals is attached
hereto as Addendum E.
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successor, RADC. See, e.g., Express Recove,y Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 2005 UT App 495, 'if 3,
125 P.3d 108.
RADC could sell and assign its 48% interest in the loan, as it bought it. It could
not, however, sell or assign Utah First's 52% interest. RADC's property rights extend
only to its share of the note, according to both contract law and property law. Further, the
participation agreement limits American "\Vest Bank's (and therefore RADC's)
participation to "$1,200,000.00." (R. 556.) The district court's judgment grants RADC
the right to collect far more than $1,200,000.
Dos Lagos adequately briefed this issue before the com1 of appeals. Though Dos
Lagos (as well as RADC, the district court, and the court of appeals) has not found legal
authority on this issue, both the statute and the contract governing the parties indicates
that the judgment should have been limited to RADC's 48% interest.
This court should therefore reverse the holding of the court of appeals and hold
that Dos Lagos's briefing on this issue was adequate and that RADC is entitled to only its
pro rata share of the loan.

19

CONCLUSION
Therefore, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the court of
appeals, set aside RADC' s judgments, and award Petitioners their attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to both statute and the contracts at issue in this case.

RESPECTFULLY SURMITTED this 21st day of September 2016.

DURHA.1'1 JON""ES & Pll\TEGAR

/s/ Dou2:las B. Thayer
Douglas B. Thayer
Andy V. \\'right

Attomeys for Petitioners

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 21st day of September 2016, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served via U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Richard C. Terry (3216)
Jeremiah R. Taylor (13933)
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
341 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 534-0909
Facsimile (801) 534-1948
richard@tjblawyers.com
j en-v@tjblawvers.com

/s/ Kim Altamirano
Kim Altamirano

21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Petitioners, through counsel and pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, hereby certify that the Brief of Petitioners complies with the typevolume limitation of Rule 24(f)(l) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Specifically, the Brief of Petitioners contains 5,586 words (according to the word count
feature in 1\1icrosoft \1/ord), exclusive of the cover page, list of paiiies, table of contents,
table of authorities, certificate of service, this certificate of compliance, and the addenda.
DATED this 21st day of September 2016.
DURHAM: JO:NES & PIN'EGAR

/s/ Douglas B. Thayer
Douglas B. Thayer
Andy V. Wright

Attorneys for Petitioners

22

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in 2010-1 RADC/C.ADC
Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89 (April 28, 2016)
Addendum B-Ruling on Dispositive Motions (April 25, 2013)
Addendum C - Order and Judgment (July 25, 2013)
Addendum D-Order and Judgment Against Defendants Roland Neil Family
Limited Partnership, Roland N. Walker, and Sally \\Talker (August 16, 2013)
Addendum E-Excerpt of Brief of Appellants, Case No. 20140675-CA
(November 19, 2014)
Addendum F- Excerpt of Reply Brief of Appellants, Case No. 20140675-CA
(April 6, 2015)

23

Addendum A

Addendum A

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
2016 UT App 89

APR 2 8 2016

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

2010-1 RADC/CADC VENTURE, LLC,

Appellee,
V.

Dos LAGOS, LLC; MELLON VALLEY, LLC; ROLAND NEIL FAlvilLY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; ROLAND N. VvALKER; AND SALLY VVALKER,
Appellants.

Opinion
No.20140675-CA
Filed April 28, 2016
Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable John R. Morris
No. 110700200
Clifford V. Dunn, Michael C. Dunn, Evan A.
Schmutz, and Jordan K. Cameron, Attorneys

for Appellants
Richard C. Terry and Jeremiah R. Taylor, Attorneys
for A ppellee
JUDGE GREGORY K.

ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
Jv1ICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and M TE A. TOOMEY concurred.1

ORME, Judge:

11

This appeal comes to us from the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture,

1. Judge James Z. Davis heard the arguments in this case but did

not have the opportunity to vote on this Opinion prior to his
death. See State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, n.L Judge Kate A.
Toomey substituted for Judge Davis and, having reviewed the
briefs and listened to the oral arguments, participated fully in
the court's resolu ti.on of this appeal.

2010-1 P-u4.DCIC.A.DC Venture, LLC ·o. Dos Lagos, LLC
LLC (RADC). Appellants ch.a.llenge the summary judgment on a
nmnber of grounds. Vve affirm.

BACKGROUND
<_[2
The pertinent facts of this case are undisputed. In 2007,
Appellants Dos Lagos, LLC, and Mellon Valley, LLC,
(Borrm•vers) receiYed a $2.5 million loan from America '\Nest
Bank. The loan ,,vas personally guarai."'1.teed by Appellants Roland
N. \!\i'alker, Sallv V\lalker, and the Rol~ri.d Neil Familv Limited
Partnership (the Guarantors). Later that year, America \f\7est
entered into a loan participation agreement ,-vith Utah First
Federal Credit Union, \-\7hereby Utah First obtai-ried a fifty-tv,.ro
percent interest in the loan and .America VVest retained a fortyeight percent interest.
J

~

'if3

One year later, on December 5, 2008, Borrowers executed
a Change in Terms Agreement, which, among other things,
extended their promissory note (the Note) ,'\rith America \Vest.
The Note ,,vas secured by real property mi\rned by 1V1ellon Valley
(the Property).
14
The FDIC ultimately closed America \Vest and seized
America West's interest in the Note, which it thereafter sold to
R.t\DC at auction. Borrnwers defaulted on the Note and received
multiple letters notifying them of the default and requesting
payment. In December 2010, RADC purchased the Propertywhich was valued at $1,510,000-at a trustee's sale for
$1,060,000. At the time of the sale, the total amount owing on the
Note was $3,426,701.91, leaving a deficiency of $1,916,701.91
behveen the amount m,ved and the value of the Property. Utah
First, whose interest in the Note had not been affected by
America VVest' s demise and the transfer of its interest, filed an
action seeking a deficiency judgment the next month.
<j[5
In its original Complaint, Utah First was the only nained
plaintiff and it erroneously indicated that the total amount m-ved
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on the Note was just $1,819,774.97.2 Dos Lagos filed a motion to
dismiss, in part because RADC was not included as a party. The
parties stipulated to allow amendment, and the First Amended
Complaint added RADC as a plaintiff. It did not, however,
correct the amount owed. Utah First and RADC sought leave to
amend again and filed the Second Amended Complaint in
September 2012, alleging the amount due as the full
$3,426,701.91.
RADC and Utah First filed motions for summary
judgment, seeking a deficiency of $1,916,701.91. Borrovvers
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied Utah First' s
motion for summary judgment, determining that there 1..vere
issues of fact surrounding the validity of the loan participation
agreement that had been executed by Utah First and America
Vvest. But it granted RADCs motion for summary judgment
against Borrowers, awarding RADC a deficiency judgment,
calculated as the difference behveen the full amount due under
the Note and the value of the property at the time of its sale to
RADC, see Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2010), subject
to any subsequently determined interest of Utah First. The
district court denied Borrowers' motion to dismiss and motion
for summary judgment.
<_[6

Shortly thereafter, RADC moved for summary judgment
against the Guarantors on the ground that judgment had been
awarded against Borrowers on the obligation guaranteed by the
Guarantors. The district court granted the motion, and

<][7

2. RADC suggests that this amount represented Utah First' s
fifty-two percent interest in the total amount owed on the Note.
But by our math, fifty-two percent of $3,426,701.91 is
$1,781,884.99.

20140675-CA
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Borrm,vers and the Guarantors (collectively, Appellants) now
appeal.3

ISSlJES AND STAND..A.RD OF REVIE\t\7
CjJ:8
Appellants first argue that RADC' s clai.i.TL did not relate
back to the original Complaint and was therefore barred by the
statute of limitations. They next contend that the district court
erred by awarding RADC the full amount due under the Note
rather than just its pro rata share. Finally, Appellants claim that
it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment
agai..i."1.St the Guarantors. All of the issues raised involve t.11.e
district court's interpretation a.i."1d application of the lav~1 in
granting summary judgment. "[V{]e review the [district] court's
legal conclusions for correctness, affording those legal
condusions no deference." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 'jf 15, 44
P.3d 781.

ANALYSIS
I. RADC's Claim Was Not Time-Barred.

CjJ:9
The resolution of Appellant's primary argument on
appeal depends on the operation of the applicable statute of
limitations. Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code requires that "'an
action ... to recover the balance due upon [an] obligation for
which [a] trust deed was given as security'1 must be commenced
"within three months after any sale of property under a trust
deed." See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2010).
Appellants argue that because RADC did not commence an
action against Borrowers ,,\Ti thin three months of the trustee's

3. Utah First moved to voluntarily dismiss its claims without
prejudice, "iNhich the district court allmved over Borrowers'
objection. Utah First is therefore not a party to this appeal.

20140675-CA
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sale, its claim was barred before it joined the action via the First
Amended Complaint. 4
110 There is no dispute that ~A:..DC was not identified as a
plaintiff in any complaint filed against Borrowers within three
months of the trustee's sale. There is also no dispute that Utah
First' s original Complaint was filed within that three-month
·window. Vvhat ,,ve must determine, then, is whether the original
Complaint operates to satisfy the three-month requirement for
RADC as well as for Utah First.

111 Appellants contend that the First Amended Complaint
impermissibly added a party to the proceeding in violation of
the applicable statute of limitations. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure allows an amended complaint to /.(relate
back to the date of the original pleading" if "the claim
... asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). Relying on the Utah
Supreme Court's opinion in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d
902 (Utah 1976), Appellants argue that this rule generally does
"not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new
parties ... whether plaintiff or defendant." See id. at 906.

•

11

4. Appellants also take issue with the district court's alternate
conclusion that "even if the claims of RADC do not relate back to
the original filing of the complaint, because the purposes of Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 have been satisfied, RADC's failure to
comply with the statute did not constitute an absolute bar to the
suit." Because we conclude that RADC's claim does relate back to
the filing of the original Complaint, we need not consider the
propriety of this alternate ruling. See generally Weber v. Snyderville
\!\Test, 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) rwe may affirm the
trial court on any proper ground.").

20140675-CA
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<jl12 Of course, there are exceptions to this general rule. The
principal exception is articulated in Sulzen v. V\filliams, 1999 UT
App 76, 977 P.2d 497, where this court stated:
[Vv]hile generally Rule 15(c) ... ,,vill not apply to an
amendment which substitutes or adds new parties
for those brought before the court by the original
pleadings, [the Utah Supreme Court has] made an
exception to the general rule. TI1e exception
operates ,,vhere there is a relation back, as to both
plaintiff a..nd defendant, when ne,,1 and old parties
have an identity of interest; so it Cru1. be assumed or
proved the relation back is not prejudicial.

Id. 'i[ 14 (alterations and omission in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). '"The rationale of Rule 15(c) is
that a party who has been notified of litigation concerning a
particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes
of limitations were intended to provide." Baldwin County
lVelcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984) (consideling
the comparable federal rule). "The same general standard of
notice applies regardless of whether a litigant seeks to add
defendants, plaintiffs, or claims." lvf.cClelland v. Deluxe Fin. Servs.,
In.c. 1 431 F. App'x 718, 723-24 (10th Cir. 2011) (considering the
comparable federal rule). Here, the First Amended Complaint
did nothlng more than add RA.DC, a successor coholder of the
very note Utah First had sued upon, as a plaintiff. It did not
assert new claims. It therefore follows that when Utah First filed
the original Complaint, seeking the deficiency behveen the
amount owed on the Note and the value of the Property
purchased by RADC at the trustee's sale, Borrowers received
sufficient notice to satisfy the rationale of rule 15(c).

'jl13 The sufficiency of the notice to Borrmvers is further
demonstrated by the identity of interest berNeen Utah First and
RADC. The cases cited by Appellants in relation to this point are
unhelpful, as they address a frame,,vork that is inapplicable to

2O140675-CA
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the facts of this case. For instance, Appellants suggest that
because "RADC and Utah First are h,vo separate and distinct
entities/' there can be no relation back. We acknm-vledge that it is
often necessary to look at the connection between the business
operations of the original and added parties, see Russell v.
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995), but that factor
alone is insufficient to resolve an identity-of-interest question.
Vv e cannot ignore the fact that although there is no direct
business or ongoing contractual relationship ben,veen Utah First
and RADC, this case centers around one debt, one promissory
note, and one trustee's sale. In very simple terms, there is but one
"'conduct, transaction, or occurrence" on which all claims are
based. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). There is perhaps no closer
identity of interest than that shared by hvo parties who are joint
holders of the same note. See generally Pentase v. Ross, 2003 UT
App 157, 116, 71 P.3d 631 ("[A]n identity of interest requires
parties to have the 'same' interest.").

i14 We also point out that as a policy matter, cases such as
this one should be decided in a single action. Cf Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-901(1) (LexisNexis 2012) ("There is only one action for
the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right,
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate and that action shall
be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."). So long
as the rights of the parties are protected and the rules of law are
followed- ·which they were here by the notice given to
Borrowers via the initial Complaint and by the identity of
interest between RADC and Utah First-our judicial system
values judicial economy. See Okelbetry v. West Daniels Land Ass'n,
2005 UT App 327, CJ[ 11, 120 P.3d 34. By allovvi.ng the
amendments to the original Complaint, the district court
furthered this objective.
II. It Was Not Error for the District Court to Award RADC the
Full Deficiency Amount.

Appellants next challenge two aspects of the district
court's order concerning the amount of the judgment. First, they
Cjl15

20140675-CA
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argue that the district court should not have awarded judgment
in the ru.Dount sought by the Second Amended Complaint-the
full deficiency amount-but should instead have limited any
judgment to a sum calculated vvith reference to the amount
claimed to be due in the original Complaint. Second, Appellants
argue that it ,,vas error to award the entire deficiency judgment
amount to RA.DC, even though the district court expressly made
that judgment subject to any later-determined interest of Utah
First. \1Ve conclude that the district court did not err in either
regard.
A.

Plaintiffs Vv ere Entitled to Recover the Full Deficiency
Amount.

'1116 The original Complaint claimed that the total amount still
due on the Note \Vas $1,819,774.97. The First Amended
Complaint., \-vhich added RADC as a plaintiff, left that amount
unchanged. Final1y, in the Second Amended Complaint, the
amount due on the Note was updated to correct the full an1ount
actually due on the Note and to state the amount still due
followir1.g the sale of the land securing the Note-$1,916,701.91.
V\Then Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, they sought a
deficiency judgment in th.is amount.

1(17 Appellants point to the language of section 57-1-32 to
argue that Plaintiffs were limited to pursuing the amount
indicated in the original Complaint. Specifically, the statute
mandates that "the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of
the indebtedness." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2010).
The question before us, as Appellants state it, is ,,vhether, based
on that language, RADC "should have been estopped from
arguing that the amount owing ·was more than what ,,vas
originally plead[ed]."
<J[18 A successful claim of estoppel would require, among
other things, a shm,ving that Appellants took reasonable actionor reasonably refrained from action-based on the misstatement
of the amount of indebtedness included in the original

20140675-CA
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Complaint. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Itrigation Co., 2011
UT 33, 'JI 41, 258 P.3d 539. According to Appellants, without
citation to any portion of the record, "[Borrowers] did not
engage in a trial and negotiation strategy that they would or
could have employed had the total amount due under the note
been originally asserted as the same amount as ultimately
claimed." This is not the sort of inaction that is contemplated by
the doctrine of estoppel.
<j[19 But even if Appellants might have acted differently in the
months follo'V\ring the filing of the original Complaint had it
included the amount actually due, the Second Amended
Complaint was filed in September 2012. The district court did
not grant RADC' s motion for summary judgment until April
2013. Thus, even ignoring the fact that Borrowers likely always
knew-and surely should have knovvn-the-fu.11 amount o·wed
under the Note, they had seven months between the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint and the district court's order
during which they could have "engage[d] in a [different] trial
and negotiation strategy" when confronted with the increased
amount, if so inclined. Because they did not do so then, there is
no reason to assume they would have done so earlier. It was
therefore not error for the district court to enter judgment based
on the amount alleged in the Second Amended Complaint once
that amount was proven.

B.

It ,"las Not Error for RADC to Receive Judgment Based on
the Full Amount Due on the Note.

<J[20 RADC had only a forty-eight percent interest in the Note,
but the district court awarded the entire deficiency amount to
RADC, albeit subject to any subsequently determined interest of
Utah First. We acknowledge that, at first glance, it might appear
that Appellants make a compelling argwnent.· After all, it seems
somewhat intuitive that as a forty-eight percent owner of the
Note, RADC should have received judgment for only forty-eight
percent of the amount still owing on the Note.

20140675-CA
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1121 Appellants complain that the district court's order,
making the judgment subject to ar1y subsequently determined
interest of Utah First, "cited no law." But after registering this
complaint, Appellants direct this court to no statute, case, or
other authority that supports their contention that the district
court got this ,-vrong. Appellants,, failure to carry their burden of
persuasion on appeal is a sufficient ground for us to reject this
ai·gument. See Hi-Country Estates Hom.eowners Ass'n v. Jesse
Rodney Dansie Living Trust, 2015 UT App 218,118,359 P.3d 655.
1122 Vve do briefly note, however, that it would be unjust to
allm•v debtors to avoid responsibility for a substantial portion of
their obligations simply because one of t\,vo creditors on a sL~gle
debt takes the laboring oar in collecting the debt. 5 See, e.g., Irons
v. American Nat'l Bank, 172 S.E. 629, 641 (Ga. 1933) CU Any one of
the holders may foreclose, giving the notice required by law to
all holders concerned."); Zalesk v. 11\lolanski, 281 Ill. App. 5~ 55
(1935) (determining that "the plaintiff, as one of the note holders,
under the terms of the trust deed, had the right to declare the
,,vhole amount of the indebtedness due and unpaid"). The
district court determined that Borrowers owed $1,916,701.91
under the Note. How that amount is divided beh,reen RA.DC
and Utah First is no business of Borrm.vers, provided that they
are the only two holders of the Note and the judgment
represents the total amount properly due under the Note. There
is no dispute that the amount awarded by surnmaiy judgment is
the total amount owed, and the qualifying language of the
judgment recognizes the possible interest of Utah First and
5. Of course,, the creditor who obtains a judgment would then
have to account to the other creditor for its interest in the note or
other instrument. Cf Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 164 P.
1047,, 1049 (Utah 1917) ("[A] person who claims the contract
price, in ,,vhole or in part, which is due to the contractor ... ,
takes the assignment subject to the claims for labor performed
and material furnished to the contractor, 1vhich ,,vas by him used
in the performance of his contract[.]").
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protects Appellants from having to pay the debt h.vice-once to
RADC and once to Utah First.
III. Summary Judgment Against the Guarantors Vvill Not Be
Disturbed.
Finally, Appellants contend that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment against the Guarantors.
Appellants' straightforward argument is that judgment was
improperly granted against Borrowers on the underlying
obligation and so the judgment against the Guarantors is
likewise invalid. Appellants recognize that their arguments on
behalf of the Guarantors rise or fall with their arguments on
behalf of Borrml\1 ers, arguing that "if the judgment that forms the
basis of the judgment against the guarantors is overturned, then
the judgment against guarantors must also be overturned."
Because we have declined to disturb the judgment against
Borrowers, we have no occasion to disturb the judgment against
the Guarantors.
ci[23

CONCLUSION
<_[24 We reject Appellants' arguments on appeal. R.t\DC ,,vas
properly added as a plaintiff to the case in the First Amended
Complaint because that amendment relates back to the original
Complaint. The district court did not err by awarding judgment
for the entire deficiency amount or by awarding that full amount
to RADC, subject, of course, to its obligation to account to Utah
First for its share of any proceeds recovered. Finally, Appellants
have not demonstrated any reason why the judgment against the
Guarantors should be disturbed.
Affirmed.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, and 2010-1 RADC/CADC
VENTURE, LLC, as successors in interest
to AMERlCA WEST BANK,
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RULING ON DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

Case No. 110700200
Judge John R. Morris

vs.
DOS LAGOS, LLC, MELLON VALLEY,
LLC, ROLAND NEIL FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ROLAND
N. WALKER, and SALLY WALKER,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on (1) Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary
Judgment, (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff2010-1 RADC/CADC
Venture, LLC, and (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary .Judgment or in the Alternative
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding
papers, along with their supporting materials, and its case file. The Court also held a hearing

on the matters on February 25, 2013. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully
advised in the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court rules as follows:

ANALYSIS
Summacy Judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material

issues of fact exist[,]., so as to determine if judgment may be rendered as a matter of law.

Draper City v. Estate ofBernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
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Here, Plaintiffs seeks summary judgment on their claims for deficiency judgment and
1

unjust enrichment. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs assert the following material facts, 2
which Defendants have not disputed:
1)

Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered into a Business
Loan Agreement with America West Bank in 2007.

2)

On December 6, 2007, America West Bank entered into a loan Participation Agreement with Utah First Federal Credit Union, wherein
America West Bank retained an undivided 48% interest in the loan
and Utah First Federal Credit Union obtained an undivided 52% in•
terest in the loan.

3)

On December 5, 2008, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC executed a Change in Terms Agreement, which restated, modified and exteoded their Promissory Note with America West Bank dated March
29, 2007, with a principal amount of$2,500 1 000.00.

4)

The Promissory Note was secured by real property owned by Mellon
Valley. LLC located in Hurricane, Washington County, Utah.

5)

The Revolving Credit Deed of Trust on the real property securing the
Promissory Note named America West Bank as beneficiary and trus•

tee.
6)
7)

8)

On May I, 2009. the FDIC closed America West Bank and seized its
interest in the Promissory Note.
Between May and December 2009, the FDIC sent Defendants multiple letters notifying them that their loan with America West Bank was
in default, and requesting payment.
On November 23, 2009, a Notice of Default under the Revolving
Credit Deed of Trust was recorded at the W ashingtOn County Recorder's Office.

1
While Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint includes claims for Breach of Real Property Note and Breach
of Guuantees, these claims seek to recover a deficiency following a trustee's sale of real property that secured

a promissory note. Accordingly. the Court shall construe Plaintiffs• claims for Breach of Real Property Note
and Breach of Guarantees as actions for deficiency judgment under Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1•32.
z To support their statement of undisputed material facts, Plaintiffs submitted the Amended Affidavit of' Paul
Toller, the Senior Vice President of Utah First Federal Credit Union, which attached copies of relevant documentation.
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9)

The Notice of Default identified Marlon L. Bates as the successor trus•
tee and indicated that the trustee elected to sell the trust property to
satisfy the delinquent obligations.

10)

In 2010, the FDIC auctioned and sold America West Bank's interest in
the loan to Plaintiff2010-1 RADC/CADCVenture, LLC.
The FDIC subsequently assigned and transferred the Revolving Credit
Deed of Trust to 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC effective August 26, 2010, and recorded the assignment at the Washington County
Recorder's Office on October 26, 201 O.
On September 21, 2010, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC
were informed via letter that their loan had been transferred from
America West Bank and that Cohen Financial was its new servicer,
acting as an agent for 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC.
On October 27, 2010, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was sent to Mellon
Valley, LLC via certified mail, but was returned undeliverable.
The Notice of Trustee's Sale was also posted at the property securing
the Promissory Note and published in a newspaper of general circula•
tion in Washington County, Utah.
On December 3, 2010, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded at the
Washington County Recorder's Office naming Marlon L. Bates as the
successor trustee under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust
On December 6. 2010. the property securing the Promissory Note was
sold at trustee's sale for $1,060.000.00 to the highest bidder, 2010.1
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC.
The value of the property securing the Promissory Note was
$1,510,000.00 at the time of the December 6, 2010 trustee's sale.

11)
~

12)

13)
14)

15)

16)

17)
18)
\ti)

19)
20)

On December 6, 2010, the outstanding payoff balance on the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust was $3,426,701.91.
On January 14, 2011, Utah First Federal Credit Union commenced
this action.
On April 29, 2011, a Special Warranty Deed conveying the property
securing the Promissory Note to 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC
was executed.
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Plaintiffs maintain that these undisputed material facts entitle them to judgment against Defendants for the deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness, $1,916,701.91, as a matter
oflaw.3
Defendants have opposed Plaintiffs' amended motion for summary judgment and
filed a cross-motion for summacy judgment arguing that they were not party to any contract

with Utah First Federal Credit Union. Defendants further argue that Utah First Federal

Credit Union has no right to enforce the Promissory Note. as its Participation Agreement
with America West Bank violates state and federal credit union laws and is void for public
policy since no Defendants were members of Utah First Federal Credit Union. As to 2010·1
RADC/CADC Venturet LLC, Defendants argue that the three-month statute of limitations

for deficiency actions bars its claims.4 Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should
~

be estopped from recovering the entire amount of deficiency, as it was not pled in their orig-

inal complaintt and that additional time for discovery is necessary regarding the charter of
Utah First Federal Credit Union, its membership guidelines, its participation in loans with
non-members, and its agreement with America West Bank.

L

The undisputed material facts establish each of the requirements for

rendering a deficiency judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and
Mellon Valley, LLC pUISuant to Utah Code Aun.§ 57-1-32.
The Utah Code provides that "[a]t any time within three months after any sale of

property under a trust deed as provided in Sections 57•1·23. 57-1-24, and 57•1-27, an action
may be commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed

was given as security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of

' While Plaintiff's' Second Amended Complaint includes claims against Roland Neil Family Limited Partner•
shipt Roland N. Walker. and Sally Walker for guaranteeing any indebtedness of Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon
Valley, LLC to America West Bank, Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment does not include
any statements of material fact relating to the existence of a guarantee. Accordingly, the Court construes Pl.am·
tiffst motion as pertaining only to their claims against Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley. LLC.
' The statute of limitations argument Defendants raise in their opposition to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment is also the sole argument raised in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff
2010.1 RADC/CADC Venturet LLC.
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the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed. the amount for which the property was
sold. and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. 0 Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-

32. uBefore rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at
the date of sale." Id. "The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by
which the amount of the indebtedness with interes~ costs, and expenses of sale, including

trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of
the sale.,. Id.
The undisputed material facts in this matter establish that the entire amount of the
indebtedness on the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust at the date of the trustee's sale was

$3,426,701.91, that the property sold at the trustee's sale for $1,060,000.00, and that the fair
market value of the property at the time of the trustee's sale was $1.510,000.00. From these
undisputed material facts the Court concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have complied with the requirements of the Utah deficiency statute and are entitled to judgment in
the amount of the deficiency, Sl,916t701.91, absent application of one of the defenses or arguments raised by Defendants.
II.

That Defendants were not party to the Participation Agreement is
immaterlal to Plaintiffs' claims; however, genuine issues of material
fact preclude summary judgment on Utah Fim Federal Credit Union's claims.

The first defenses raised by Defendants are that Utah First Federal Credit Union
cannot seek remedy for Defendants• breach of the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust, as Defendants were not party to its Participation Agreement with America West Bank. Defendants also argue that the Participation Agreement violates state and federal credit union laws
and is void for public policy, as no Defendants were members of Utah First Federal Credit
Union prior to the entry of the Participation Agreement. The Court finds that Defendants'
arguments are without merit. By the plain language of the Business Loan Agreement that

Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered with America West Bank, Dos Lagos,

LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC agreed that America West Bank could sell or transfer partici-
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pation interests in the loan to third parties, such as Utah First Federal Credit Union, with-

out notice or obligation to notify the borrowers. See Business Loan Agreement, pg. 4, ,i Miscellaneous Provisions, Consent to Loan Participation. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is
immaterial to Plaintiffs' claims whether Defendants were party to Utah First Federal Credit
Union's Participation Agreement with America West Bank.
Additionally, Defendants argument that the Participation Agreement is void does
not preclude summary judgment on 2010-1 RADC/CADC Ventttre, LLC's claim for defi-

ciency judgment. Indeed, Defendants concede that 20 I 0-1 RADC/CADC Venture. LLC
may seek remedy against Defendants for the entire amount of deficiency, subject to its com..
pliance with the requirements of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. As to Utah First Federal Credit

Union's claims, however, Defendants correctly note that both state and federal laws permit
a credit union to participate in loans only if the loan is made to the credit union's own

members or the member of another participating credit union. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 7-9·
20(7)(b)(il)(A) & (8)(c)(ii)(A); see also 12 C.F.R. § 701 .22(d)(2). The Court finds that genuine

issues of material fact exist with regard to whether Roland N. Walker was a member of
Utah First Federal Credit Union prior to its entry into the Participation Agreement with

America West Bank. The Court is also unwilling on summary judgment to determine
whether public policy renders the Participation Agreement void if no Defendants were, in
fact, members of Utah First Federal Credit Union prior to its entry of the Participation

Agreement.5 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the existence of genuine issues of mate•
rial fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Utah First Federal Credit Union on its
claim for deficiency judgment.

'Plaintiffs' argument that a private cause of action does not exist when a participation agreement violates state
and federal aedit union laws is inelevant in this case, as Defendants are not attempting to assert a private
cause of action. Rather, Defendants are asserting an affirmative defense to Utah First Federal Credit Union's
ability to seek remedy for breach of the Defendants• obligations under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust by

virtue of the Participation Agreement.
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The Court also concludes that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
1

judgment on Utah First Federal Credit Union s unjust enrichment claim. It is unclear from
the undisputed material facts whether Utah First Federal Credit Union actually conferred a
benefit on Defendants by virtue of its Participation Agreement, or merely conferred a benefit
on American West Bank. See Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, ,i29, 240 P.3d 754 ("A claim

for unjust enrichment in Utah requires proof of three elements: (1) a benefit conferred on
one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.") (Internal quotations omitted). Further, even if Utah First Federal Credit Union did confer a
benefit on Defendants, the Court declines to determine on summary judgment whether it
would be inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit without remunerating Utah First
Federal Credit Union given the Court's concern with the effect of public policy on the enforceability of the Participation Agreement See Id. The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiffs•
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it pertains to the claims of Utah First

Federal Credit Union. 6
llL

2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's deficiency judgment claims
are not batted by the three-month statute of limitations for deficiency actions under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32.
The next defense raised by Defendant is that 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's

deficiency judgment claims are barred by the three-month statute of limitations of Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-32. The Court finds that this argument is without merit. Utah First Feder-

6

The Court finds that Defendant's request for a Rule 56(t) continuance is rendered moot by the Court's denial
of Plaintiffs• Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Utah First Federal Credit Union, as
the request pertained only to discovery directed at Utah First Federal Credit Union and not 2010.1

RADC/CADC Venturc, LLC. Moreover, more than two years have passed since this matter was initiated uid
the Court has previously permitted several extensions of time for discovery to be completed. Defendants have
failed to assert a sufficient basis for an additional extension of time for discovery and given the undisputed material facts, the Court finds that additional discovery is unnecessary for a determination of 2010-1

RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's claim for deficiency judgment
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al Credit Union initiated this action on January 14. 2011, well within three months of the
property's December 6, 2011 trustee's sale. Defendants subsequently filed their Answer to

Plaintifrs Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 17(a) arguing that 2010·1
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC is the real party in interest to the action. Thereafter, Utah
First Federal Credit Union filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on August 15,

2011, seeking to add 2010·1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC to the action as a party plaintiff.
The parties then filed a Stipulation to Allow Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Withdraw
Pending Motions on September 7, 2011. and Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on
November 15, 2011. While Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' First A.mended Complaint

raises an affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations. the Court finds
that Defendants' prior stipulation to the inclusion of 2010-1 R.ADC/CADC Ven~1.1re, LLC
as a party plaintiff constitutes a waiver of Defendant's statute of limitations defense. See So-

ter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935. 942 (Utah 1993) C'A waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.").

The Court finds that Defendants were clearly aware of 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture.

LLC's interest in the action by virtue of their Rule 17(a) motion to dismiss, but nevertheless,
agreed to the filing of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint rather than challenging the amendment as being futile as a result of a running of the statute of limitations.
Regardless of Defendants' waiver, however, Rule lS(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleadings, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleadings."
Utah R. Civ. P. lS(c). "This rule allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of limitations ... Russell v. Standard Corp.•

898 P.2d 263, 26S (Utah 1995). Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure additionally
provides:
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No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a).

In applying these rules to this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Amended Com•
plaint relates back to the date of Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint The
amendments included within Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint arose out of the same transaction set forth in the original complaint and an identity of interest exists between Utah First

Federal Credit Union and 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. Cf. Russell, 898 P.2d at
265 (upholding the general rule that relation back under Rule lS(c) does not apply to
amendments that add new parties who have no identity of interest with existing parties).
While Defendants correctly assert that that privity of contract is generally an insufficient

identity to interest for the purposes of relation back under Rule IS(c), see Perry v, Pioneer

Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P .2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984), the i~ntity of interest between Plain•
tiffs goes beyond mere privity of contract. Plaintiffs assert shared, undivided interests in the
deficiency on the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. Based upon this identity of interest, the
Court finds that Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint sufficiently placed
Defendants on timely notice that a deficiency judgment was sought by the creditors of the

Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. The Court, therefore, concludes that Plaintiffs' Amended

Complaint relates back to the filing of Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint
and 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's deficiency judgment claims are not barred by
the three-month statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32.
This conclusion is also supported by the primary pu.tposes of Utah's deficiency
judgment statute. "The primary purposes of section 57-1-32 are (1) to prevent the creditor

from purchasing the property for below market value at the trustee's sale and then suing the
debtor or guarantor for a large deficiency. and (2) to provide a debtor or guarantor with
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prompt notice that the creditor intends to pursue a deficiency so as to allow the debtor or
guarantor to plan its finances.,, Jv.fachock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30, ,I26, 137 P.3d 779. The Utah

Supreme Court has further "recognized that section 57-l-32's requirement that a creditor file
a deficiency action within three months is a 'procedural hurdle,, not an absolute bar to suit."
Id. at ,i25. Accordingly, uas long as the primary purposes of the statute are satisfied, an ac-

tion will not be barred for failure to initially meet certain procedural requirements of section
57-1-32." Id. at,i26. Here, both purposes of Uta.h's deficiency judgment statute are satisfied,
as the deficiency judgment Plaintiffs' seek is based upon the fair market value of the property sold at the December 6, 2010 trustee's sale, and as the debtor and guarantor Defendants
were timely placed on notice that a deficiency judgment was sought by the creditors of the

Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC.
IV.

Defendants' estoppel argument is without merit and 2010-1
RADC/CADC is entitled to judgment in the amount of the deficiency on the entire amoant of indebtedness, subject to any subsequently determined interest of Utah First Federal Credit Union.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be estopped from recovering a deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust, as

this amount was not pled in Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint. Defendants' argument, however, ignores that the Court twice permitted the filing of amended complaints in this matter. The Court permitted the filing of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint
on November 15, 2011, which added 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC as a party plaintiff to the litigation, following the filing of a stipulation to the amendment. The Court then

granted leave for the filing of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on September 6, 2012,
following Defendants• failure to file an opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to .Amend.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint asserts the entire amount of indebtedness under the

Revolving Credit Deed of Trust that Plaintiffs now seek on summary judgment Under these
circumstances. the Court finds no basis to estop Plaintiffs from seeking the recovery of a de-
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ficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trost.
Moreover, Defendants have cited no legal authority to support their argument other than
1

Utah s deficiency statute, which states that uthe complaint shall set forth the entire amount

of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint satisfies this requirement and the primary purposes of the
Utah's deficiency statute were satisfied by the filing of Utah First Federal Credit Union's
original complaint See Machock, 2006 UT 30, 'tffl25-26. Moreover, by rule Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint relates back to the date of the original pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P.
IS(c) & 17(a). The Court, therefore1 finds that Defendants' estoppel argument is without
merit Accordingly, the Court concludes that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that

2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC is entitled to judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and
Mellon Valley, LLC in the amount of $1,916,701.91, the deficiency on the entire indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. 7 The Court, therefore, GRANTS Plaintiff's'
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it pertains to 2010-1 RADC/CADC
Venture, LLC, and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alterna-

tive Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court:
1)

GRANTS Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as

it pertains to 2010·1 RA.DC/CADC Venture, LLC;
2)

DENIES Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summazy Judgment insofar as it

pertains to Utah First Federal Credit Union;
3)

DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 2010-1

RADC/CADC Venture. LLC; and

7 2010.1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's judgment a.gahlst Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC for the
amount of the deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trost,
LLC is, however, subject to any subsequently determined interest of Utah First Federal Credit Union.
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4)

DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alterna-

tive Rule 56(t) Motion for Continuance.
The Court directs Plaintiffs to prepare and submit an Order and a Judgment that is
consistent with and reflects this Ruling.
Date signed:

L-f:/~/·/

3
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Defendants.
- - - - ..... -· - -

... ,

___

'

On February 25, 2013, the Court held a hearing on (1) Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment, (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 2010-1
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, and (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the

Alternative Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. After reviewing the moving and responding
papers, hearing the arguments, and considering the pleadings, depositions, answers to
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interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other evidence, if any, in the Court's file, the Court
issued a Ruling on Dispositive Motions on April 25, 2013, which ruling is incorporated herein by

reference. Consistent with that ruling, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES
that:
1.

Plaintiff 20 J0- I RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's ('1RADC 11) Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED. There is no genuine issue of material fact to the extent the
case pertains to RADC, and RADC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Defendants
Dos Lagos, LLC and Melon Valley, LLC,jointly and severally, as follows:
$1,916,701.91

The Principal Deficiency Amount on the entire
indebtedness under the Revolving credit Deed of Trust with
interest accruing on the principal amount from June 06, 2013, at
the default contract rate of2 l % per annum until paid in full.

$1,006,819.88

Accrued Interest from December 6, 20 I 0, to June 6, 20 J 3
at the default contract rate of 21 % per annum with interest
accruing thereon from June 7, 2013, at the federal post-judgment
rate plus 2% until paid in full.

$943.80

Costs incurred by RADC as of June 6, 2013, with interest
accruing thereon from June 7, 2013, at the federal post-judgment

rate plus 2% until paid in full.
$18,958.37

Attorney's Fees incurred by RADC as of June 6, 2013, with
interest accruing thereon from June 7, 2013, at the federal postjudgment rate plus 2% until paid in full.

$2,943,423.96

TOTAL JUDGMENT

This Judgment may be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees
expended in collecting this judgment. Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendants any request to
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augment the judgment, and Defendants shall have 30 days from the date of service to file an
objection.

2.

Plaintiff Utah First Federal Credit Union1s Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.
3.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC

Venture, LLC is DENIED.
4.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Rule 56(f)

Motion for Continuance are both DENIED.

Approved as to form and content by:

/s/ Michael C. Dunn
Attorney for Defendants
(signed electronically with Mr. Dunn's permission)

***END OF DOCUMENT***
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CERTIFICATE OF SER VICE

I certify that on July 12, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT (proposed) to the following by electronic filing, by email.

or by mail, postage prepaid.

Michael C. Dunn
Clifford V. Dunn
Dunn Law Finn

PO Box 2318
110 West Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84 771-2318
mdunn@dunnfirm.com
Isl
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Richard C. Tecry, USB No. 3216
Jeremiah R.. Taylor, USB No. 13933
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
l41 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-270S
Telephone: 801/S34-0909
Fax: 801/S34-1948

richard®tjblawyaa.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY

FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH FIRST FEDERAL CR.EDIT UNION,
and 2010· 1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as
successors in interest to AMERICA WEST

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Against Defendants Roland Neil F'amlly
Limited Partnership, Roland N. Walker,
, and Sally Walker

BANK.
Plaintiffs,

v.
\ Civil No. 110700200
DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, MELLON VALLEY, LLC,, a Utah
limited liability company, ROLAND NEIL
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
ROLAND N. WALKER.. an individual and
SALLY WALKE~ an individual,

IJudge John R. Moms
i

•

I
I
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Defendants.
On Juty 15, 2013, Plaintiff RADC moved this Coun for summary judgment against
Defendants Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland N. Walker, and Sally Walker (the
..Guarantors"). The time to oppose R.Aoc•s motion has passed, and Defendants have not filed a

responsive memorandum or affidavit in opposition to RADC•s motion. The Court bas reviewed
the moving papers and considered the pleadings, depositions, answers

to

interrogatories,
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admissions, affidavits, and/or other evidence, if any, in the Court's file. The Court concludes that
the foregojng show there is no genuine issue e.s to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

THEREFORE, IT IS HER.EBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
I.

Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's ("RA.DC") Motion for Summary

Judgment against Guarantors is GRANTED. RA.DC is entitled to judgment as a matter of Jaw
against the Guarantors, jointly and severalty, as foflows:
$1,916,701.91

The Principal Deficiency Amount on the entire
indebtedness under the Revolving credit Deed of Trust with
interest accruing on the principal amount from August 9, 2013, at
the default contract rate 21 % per annum until paid in full.

or

SJ ,076,293.76

Accrued Interest from December 6, 2010, to August 8,
the default contract rate of 21 % per annum with interest
accruing thereon from August 9, 2013, at the federal post-

20 J3,

at

judgment rate plus 2% until paid in full.
S943.80

Costs incwred by RADC as of August 8, 2013, with
interest accruing thereon from August 9, 2013, at the federal postjudgment rale plus 2% until paid in full.
Attorney's Fees incurred by RADC as of August 8, 2013,

$21,560.42

with interest accruing thereon from August 9, 2013, at the federal
post-judgment rate plus 2% until paid in full.

TOTAL JUDGMENT

$3,015,499.89

This Judgment may be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees
expended in collecting this judgment. Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendants any request to

augment the judgment. and Defendants shall have 30 days from the date of service to file an
2
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objectio~

-t:**END OF D O C ~

CER]TFiCATE QE SERVICE.
I certify that on August B, 2013, I caused to be served a ttue and correct copy of the

foregoing ORDER AND IUDGMENT (proposed) to the following by electronic filing.

Michael C. Dunn
Clifford V. Dunn
Dunn Law Firm
PO Box2318
110 West Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84771-2318
mdunn@dunnfirm.com

ts! Richard C. Iol'O'

3

August 16, 2013 02:27 AM

3 of3

,

AddendumE

AddendumE

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as
successors in interest to America West
Banlc,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

vs.
DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, MELLON VALLEY, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company, ROLAND
NEIL FAMILY LIMITED
PAR1NERSIDP;ROLANDN. WALKER,
an individual and SALLY WALKER, an
individual,

Case No: 20140675- CA

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County,
Fannington Departmen4 State of Utah
The Honorable John R. Morris
RICHARD C. TERRY (NO. 3216)
JEREMIAH R. TAYLOR (NO. 13933)
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
341 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-270S

Clifford V. Dunn (No. 933)
Michael C. Dunn (No. 10927)
DUNN LAW FIRM
P.O. Box 2318
St. George, Utah 84771-2318

Telephone: (801) 534-0909
Facsimile: (801) S34-1948
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

Telephone: (435) 628-5405
Facsimile: (435) 628-4145

RADC

Attorneys [Qr Defendants/Appellants

complaint, RADC's filing happened long after the three month statute of limitations
expired. Courts have held that the three month deadline set forth in section 57-1-32 can
be a mere procedural hurdle, and not an absolute bar to suit only if the purposes of section
57-1-32 are satisfied. Standard Federal Savines & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 1991 Utah
LEXIS 42, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138. Those purposes include preventing windfalls to
creditors, and providing the debtor and guarantor notice that the creditor intends to pursue
the deficiency. Machock, 2006, UT 30! ~26. The facts of this case show that AADC·s
and Utah Firsf s conduct in the district court proceeding did not satisfy the purposes of
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. and AADC!s complaint should have been dismissed. and the
district courf s failure to do so is reversible error.
The district court ruled in favor of RA.DC, and found that judgment in favor of
RA DC was appropriate for the full amount due under the Note, despite RADC only
owning 48% of the Note. and despite a finding that the judgment in favor of RADC was
subject to a factual detennination regarding Utah First"s interest in the Note. The district
court·s summary judgment in favor of RA.DC based on the full amount of the Note was
reversible error.
a. The district court should not have granted judgment for RADC based on the full
amount ofthe Note. subject to a later determination of Utah First 's interest.

In its ruling, the district court denied Utah First"s motion for summary judgment~
due to issues of fact, but granted summary judgment in favor of RA.DC. The district
court's ruling for RADC granted RADC ~ deficiency based on the full amount of the
indebtedness under the loan ($3,426! 701.91 ). despite RADC being a mere 48% interest
• 14 •

holder. (R. p. 835-836) In entering this ruling~ the district court added a footnote which
stated: ·-[RADC]'s judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC for the
amount of the deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving
Credit Deed of Trust, LLC[sicJ is~ however, subject to any subsequent detennined interest
of Utah First Federal Credit Union.'" (R. p. 836)(Exhibit A. p. 11 ). In making this
detennination, the district court cited no law, and provided no valid reason for awarding
RADC the full judgment rather than its proportionate share of the Note.
The amended complaint that added RA.DC as a plaintiff asserted that RA.DC only
owned 48% of the Note under ·which deficiency was being sought. (R. p. 304) Allowing
RA.DC to recover more than its proportionate share of the note would subvert public
policy and be in direct violation of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. The result of the ruling is a
windfalJ to RADC, the very thing the Code is intended to prevent.
As noted previously, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 has two primary purposes: 1) to
prevent windfalls to creditors who buy properties at below market and pursue large
deficiencies: and 2) provide notice to the debtor and guarantor of the credito(s intent to
pursue a deficiency. The district court in granting RADC's motion for the full amount of
the deficiency, violated the first articulated purpose of the statute. The district court
judgment allows RADC to collect more than double what it may be entitled'! and expose
Defendants to the jeopardy of multiple claims against them. In fact, the district court

dismissed Utah Firsf s claims ·•without prejudice'" leaving the door open for a later claim

by Utah First if it deems it appropriate to do so. (R. pp 1097-1101) The total amount of
• 15 -

RADC'sjudgment, if valid, could have been no more than $920,016.91! 48% of a
deficiency, when based on the full amount of Note. More appropriately, the amount
could be no more than $148,691.52, 48% of a deficiency based upon the amount of the
note as alleged in the original complaint of RADC (See Section e below).
At the same time it ruled in favor of RADC's motion for summary judgment, the
district court ruled that there existed genuine issues of material fact related to Utah Firsf s
claims (R. p. 832). The district courf s mling makes it is impossible for a judgment in
favor of RADC to have been detenninable as a matter of law~ because the district court· s
ruling was subject first to a detennination of Utah First's interest. RADCs judgment
cannot be detennined as a matter of law, when its final value relies entirely upon the
detennination of specific and genuine issues of fact.

Either the judgment in favor of RADC was appropriate, but not in an appropriate
amount~ or it was not appropriate because there existed genuine issues of material fact
and the matter must be remanded for that detennination. Either way, the district court
erred and this Court should overturn its rulings.
b. Defendants' stipulation to a/lo1,v an amended complaint did not constitute a waiver
of Defendants' right to assert a statute of limitations defense.

The district court's ruling concluded that ··[w]hile Defendants' Answer to
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint raises an affinnative defense based upon the
applicable statute of limitations, the Court finds that Defendants' prior stipulation to the
inclusion of 20 l 0-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC as a party plaintiff constitutes a waiver
of Defendants' statute of limitations defense.'· (R. p. 833) In support of its position, the
• 16 -
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
2010-1 R.ADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as
successor in interest to America West
Bank,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.

Case No. 20140675-CA

DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, MELLON
VALLEY, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, ROLAND NEIL FAlv1ILY

District Court Case No. 110700200

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; ROLAND
N. WALKER, an individual and
SALLY WALKER, an individual,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah
The Honorable John R. Morris
Richard C. Terry
Jeremiah R. Taylor
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff!Appellee

Evan A. Schmutz (3 860)
Jordan K. Cameron (12051)
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
3301 N. Thanksgiving Way, Ste 400
Lehi, Utah 84043
Telephone (801) 375-6600
Facsimile (801) 375-3865
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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ARGlJMENT
I. RADC IS NOT ENTITLED TO A F1JLL DEFICIENCY lJNTIER THE LOlL"N" ANTI
PARTICIPATION AGREEJvfENTS.

The district court misconstrued the Loan Agreement, the Commercial Guaranties,
and the Participation Agreement ,Nhen it ruled that R_ADC ·was entitled to judgment for

the full deficiency under the Note, despite R.ADC only ov.711.ing 48% of the Note.
Under Utah contract law,
[w]hen determining whether the plain language is ambiguous, [the court]
attempt[s] to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms. [T]o
harmonize the provisions of a contract, we examine the entire contract and all of
its parts in relation to each other and give a reasonable construction of the contract
as a whole to determine the parties' intent. Also, [w ]hen interpreting the plain
language, we look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids
rendering any provision meaningless.

Nolin v. S & S Const., Inc., 2013 UT App 94,113,301 P.3d 1026, 1029 cert. denied sub
nom. Nolin v. S & S Const., 312 P.3d 619 (Utah 2013) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also lvfcNeil Engineering v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423, ~8 (':Under
well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look to the language of the contract to
determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. Vle also consider each
contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to
all and ignoring none. If the language ·within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter oflaw.:') (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "the specification of tenns in a contract
implies the exclusion of all not expressed." 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 415.

1

In relevant part, the plain language of the Loan Agreement provides that the
''Borrower agrees and consents to Lender's sale or transfer, whether now or later, of one
or more participation interests in the Loan to one or more purchasers .... Borrower also
agrees that the purchasers of any such participation interests will be considered as the
absolute owners of such participation interests. Borrmver further ... unconditionally
agrees that either Lender or such purchaser may enforce Borrower's obligation under the
Loan irrespective of the failure or insolvency of any holder of any interest in the Loan.''
(R. p. 771 (emphasis added).)
Under the district court's ruling, RADC is entitled to the full amount of the Note,
or the entire indebtedness of the Defendants. However, "Indebtedness" is defined in the
Loan Agreement as "the indebtedness evidenced by the Note or Related Documents,
including all principal and interest together with all other indebtedness and costs and
expenses for which Borrower is responsible under this Agreement or under any of the
Related Documents." (R. p. 772.) In other words, if the parties negotiated and intended
for a participation interest to be entitled to the entire indebtedness under the Loan
Agreement, it would have provided that "the purchasers of any such participation
interests will be considered as the absolute owners of [the Indebtedness]," or similar
language. The parties clearly never intended a participation interest to grant rights of
ownership or collections against the entire deficiency. While it is undisputed that RADC
has a right to its own participation interest of 48%, the di~trict court overreached wh~n it
awarded ·RADc the entire deficiency. ·

2

The provisions of other contracts at issue confirm that the district court erred ·when
it awarded RA.DC the entire deficiency. Toe Cornmercial Guaranties contain language
consistent v~'ith the Loan Agreement, specificaliy, that "Guarantor authorizes Lender,
either before or after any revocation hereof, ,:v·ithout notice or demand and without
lessening Guarantor: s liabilicy under this Guarancy, from time to time ... (G) to sell,
transfer, assign or grant participations in all or any part of the indebtedness .... " (R. pp.
779, 782.) '\Vhile participation interests are allowed: there is nothing to indicate that a
participation interest is transformed into a larger interest that may claim an entire
deficiency. Surely, the Commercial Guarantee cannot be read to create a contractual
right to multiply the total amount owed by Defendant.

In addition, the Participation Agreement defines the parameters of the
participation of Utah First Federal Credit Union in America West Bank's Loan
Agreement with Defendants. Under the Participation Agreement, Utah First Federal
Credit Union received a "Participation Equal to: $1,300,000.00." (R. p. 786.) Further,
Utah First Credit Union's participation share is explicitly 52%, while America West
Bank's retained share is 48%. (R. p. 787.) There is nothing in the Participation
Agreement that entitles .t\.I.nerica West or RADC, as a successor to America West Bank's
share, to have a judgment for the entire deficiency.
As noted in the Brief of Appellants, and for which RADC provides no counter,

liv1achock v. Fink_ stands for the proposition that Section 57-1-32 may bar suit by a
creditor to prevent win~falls to the creditor. 2006 UT 30, 'if 26, 137 P.3d 779. In this case,
awarding RADC an entire deficiency when it is only entitled to a 48%
participation
.
.
3

interest is a windfall to RADC. 1 The district court's ruling allows RADC to collect more
than double what it may be entitled, and exposes Defendants to an unwarranted additional
judgment in the event the district court ultimately grants Utah First a deficiency judgment
based on its percentage. (R. pp. 1097-1101, the district court dismissed Utah First's
claims without prejudice). Such a result ·would amount to a windfall to RADC.
II. ISSUES REMAIN REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THAT
PRECLUDE ENTRY OF JUDG:MENT IN FAVOR OF RADC.
·..,j)

A. Until the Trial Court determines Utah First's rights under the
Participation Agreement, it cannot determine whether RADC's action
relates back to the original complaint filed by Utah First.
The Utah Code dictates that a deficiency action must be brought within three
months after any sale of property under a trust deed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32.
The parties do not dispute that Utah First initiated an action within three months, rather,
the parties dispute whether the addition of RADC as a separate party plaintiff and its
assertion of its own separate claim for deficiency, long after the expiration of the three
month statute of limitation, relates back to Utah First' s original filing under Rule 15(c) or
Rule 17(a). Appellees conceded that ,,1here an amended complaint adds an additional
1

RADC arguments regarding the amount it is owed, even under a 48% ownership
interest, are unsupported by basic math. The first Complaint filed with the trial court
alleged a deficiency amount of $1,819,774.97. (R. p. 3; see also R. pp. 225-226 and 551552). The Second Amended Complaint alleged a deficiency of $3,426,701.91. (R. p.
639). RA.DC attempts to justify the amount it alleged in its Second Amended Complaint
by arguing that the Original Complaint mistakenly alleged a total indebtedness of only
$1,~19,_774.97 which inaq.vertently took into accqunt"only Utah.First's .52% interest in the
Note .. (see R.:·p.-3;·see also R. pp: 225-226 and 551-552; Brief of Appellee, p. 6, ~'il 2627):~owever, 52% of$3,426~701.91 does not equal $1,819,774~97. ~ri fact,. s2ro of
$3,426,701.91 is $1,781,884.99. Similarly, 48% of $3,426,701.9i does not equal
$1,606,926.94, as RADC argues, but rather, is $1,644,8i6.92. (See Brief of Appellee at p.
7, 'il 29)°. .
4

